New development in Libya arms trafficking case

Last November I covered the story of Marc Turi, an arms dealer who was indicted for allegedly lying on his export license application. He is accused of declaring Qatar to be the “end user” of his weapons when he intended for them to end up in the hands of anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya. Turi’s defense has utilized the public authority defense, alleging that he was part of a covert operation to arm the Libyan rebels in 2011.

In a filing by Turi’s defense team from a couple of weeks ago requesting the disclosure of certain grand jury materials, an incident before the grand jury in which the prosecution silenced a retired CIA officer is cited. The retired officer, David Manners, served as the CIA’s station chief in both Prague, Czechoslovakia and Amman, Jordan. During his grand jury testimony on 2 July 2013, he “began to explain covert arms transfers to the grand jury, believing it to be germane to the Government’s line of questioning.” In his own words:

I was abruptly interrupted by the attorney for the United States who told me to stop speaking because I was not asked a question. Near the conclusion of my testimony, a member of the grand jury asked whether the United States Government, either directly or indirectly, supplied weapons to the Libyan Transitional National Council. I began answering the grand juror’s question affirmatively, but was again abruptly interrupted by the same Assistant United States Attorney who said something to the effect of “You don’t know that.” But I do “know that.” It was then, and remains now, my opinion that the United States did participate, directly or indirectly, in the supply of weapons to the Libyan Transitional National Council.

According to the defense’s filing, this conduct on the part of the prosecution may enable a dismissal of the indictment. It cites a case in which it was ruled that charges may be dismissed when “[prosecutorial] misconduct has significantly infringed upon the grand jury’s ability to exercise its independent judgment.”

The case may appear bizarre since the US government seemingly has little incentive to railroad its own covert arms dealers. But when read in context with a New York Times article from 5 December 2012:

Mr. Turi said he believed that United States officials had shut down his proposed arms pipeline because he was getting in the way of the Obama administration’s dealings with Qatar. The Qataris, he complained, imposed no controls on who got the weapons. “They just handed them out like candy,” he said.

Beyond the neocons: Those assigning blame for Iraq War must consider role played by liberal multilateralists and realists

For many who look with horror at the carnage visited upon Iraq since the US invasion in March 2003, there seems to be a fixation on neoconservatives that often times appears deflective. Of course, it is perfectly reasonable to look at the role played by neoconservative ideology and its promotion of unilateral military action against purported “rogue states” and agitation to unparalleled US domination of global affairs. At the same time, the resulting analysis should not obscure or minimize the role played by other prominent ideologies among the US diplomatic establishment in greasing the skids for the US invasion.

The Blame The Neocons Only narrative tends to focus on a cabal-like group of figureheads who are commonly associated with the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Individuals who would later go on to serve high positions in the administration that invaded Iraq–such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld and John Bolton–all signed an open letter to President Clinton on behalf of PNAC that urged a harder line against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Focusing on these groups and individuals is useful when determining why the administration of George W. Bush felt it had the right to launch a full-scale military invasion of Iraq explicitly against the wishes of the UN and many of the US’ largest allies. What it fails to fully account for is the reason relations with Iraq had deteriorated so severely that regime change through overwhelming unilateral force was even a consideration, let alone a preferred course of action.

The administration of George HW Bush was overwhelmingly realist in its orientation towards foreign policy. In its approach to Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait, it made much fanfare of its  multilateralism in building a large coalition and seeking UN approval for military action. In Bush’s January 1991 national address announcing the start of the Persian Gulf War, he declared that: “we have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order–a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations […] an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.’s founders.” Such an appeal to international cooperation makes it easy to contrast his presidency favorably with that of his son. But it would be incredibly misleading to suggest that his administration’s policy towards Saddam Hussein’s regime–before and after the Gulf War–was based on international consensus. In word and deed, the presidency of Bush 41 planted the seeds for Bush 43’s invasion.

Consider the fact that Saddam Hussein’s numerous offers of a conditional withdraw from Kuwait were immediately rebuffed or ignored. The official stance of the US following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was that it would be unacceptable if Hussein managed to gain “even a scintilla of profit–a Kuwaiti island or minor border adjustments” from the crisis. The US also rejected any role fellow Arab states could play in mediating the dispute between the Iraqi regime and Kuwait’s rulers. The Bush administration stubbornly refused Saddam Hussein any “face-saving way of getting out of Kuwait” up to the time the first bombs fell.

As William Blum has pointed out, Iraq had very real grievances against Kuwait and other Gulf monarchies:

[The Gulf War] had its origins in the brutal 1980-88 war between Iraq and Iran.  Iraq charged that while it was locked in battle, Kuwait was engaged in stealing $2.4 billion of oil from the Rumaila oil field that ran beneath the vaguely-defined Iraq-Kuwait border and was claimed in its entirety by Iraq; that Kuwait had built military and other structures on Iraqi territory; and worst of all, that immediately after the war ended, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates began to exceed the production quotas established by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), flooding the oil market, and driving prices down.  Iraq was heavily strapped and deeply in debt because of the long war, and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared this policy was an increasing threat to his country – “economic war”, he called it, pointing out that Iraq lost a billion dollars a year for each drop of one dollar in the oil price. Besides compensation for these losses, Hussein insisted on possession of the two Gulf islands which blocked Iraq’s access to the Gulf as well as undisputed ownership of the Rumaila oilfield.

Career US diplomat James Atkins has gone as far as saying that “our nightmare in the last days was that Saddam would withdraw, then we wouldn’t be able to go forward with our grand plans to destroy Iraq and the infrastructure.” Fortunately for the US military establishment, Iraqi forces remained in Kuwait past the deadline set by the UN Security Council and the US could proceed to destroy Iraq’s military and civilian infrastructure without reproach.

The Persian Gulf War succeeded in forcing Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait and also in decimating Iraq’s highly advanced civilian infrastructure. A report by a UN fact-finding mission from March 1991 stated plainly that “nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation which has now befallen the country” and that the “near-apocalyptic results” of the war had sent Iraq into a “pre-industrial age.” The war aggravated the problems caused by comprehensive UN sanctions, which were previously imposed following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

The report noted that the price of basic goods skyrocketed by 1,000% and that government provided rations were running desperately low. Since Iraq had typically imported about 70% of its food needs, the sanctions had an extremely detrimental effect on civilian population’s ability to get adequate nutrition. Domestic food production through agriculture and livestock were further degraded. Farmers were dependent on imports of seeds and multiple seed storage facilities were destroyed during the war. Similarly, livestock had been dependent on imports for feed and the war apparently destroyed Iraq’s “sole laboratory producing veterinary vaccines.”

The US bombing campaign also damaged 17 out of 20 of the country’s electric power plants, with 11 of them being rendered irreparable. Even four months after the war ended, Iraq was producing only 20% to 25% of its pre-war electrical output. This in turn deeply compromised Iraq’s ability to purify and distribute its drinking water, treat its sewage and refrigerate its food. The UN report estimated at the time that the supply of clean water in Baghdad per person was about 10% of what it had been previously. Without operable sewage plants, Iraqis had no choice but to start dumping raw sewage into their rivers, effectively polluting their main source of drinking water.

The immediate, cumulative effect of the draconian sanctions and the US aerial campaign against Iraq’s infrastructure was indeed nothing short of catastrophic. A Harvard University medical study team estimated that 170,000 Iraqi children would die by the end of 1991 due to US policy. The study cited increased epidemics of ” gastroenteritis, cholera and typhoid” as among the chief causes of death.

The Washington Post revealed months later that inducing massive suffering among Iraq’s civilian population was an intentional strategy of collective punishment. By targeting electric power plants, transportation infrastructure, water utilities and food storage facilities, the US hoped to put pressure on Iraqi civilians since it believed they were at least partially complicit in the invasion of Kuwait.  One senior Air Force officer told the Post that “The definition of innocents gets to be a little bit unclear […] they do live there, and ultimately the people have some control over what goes on in their country.” Another Air Force officer claimed that the targeting of civilian infrastructure was done to “accelerate the effects of the sanctions.”

Further evidence that the US foresaw the humanitarian crisis in Iraq can be found in a Defense Intelligence Agency document from January 1991 entitled “Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities”:

Iraq depends on importing-specialized equipment–and some chemicals to purify its water supply, most of which is heavily mineralized and frequently brackish to saline. With no domestic sources of both water treatment replacement parts and some essential chemicals, Iraq will continue attempts to circumvent [UN] sanctions to import these vital commodities. Failing to secure supplies will result in a shortage of pure drinking water for much of the population. This could lead to increased incidences, if not epidemics, of disease.

Many argue that all Iraq needed to do to get the sanctions lifted was cooperate fully with UN weapons inspections and destroy all of its remaining WMD. However, public statements from a couple months after the war make it clear that the US wanted to keep the sanctions squeeze on the Iraqi people as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power:

  • Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates, May 7: “Saddam is discredited and cannot be redeemed. His leadership will never be accepted by the world community and, therefore, Iraqis will pay the price while he remains in power. […] All possible sanctions will be maintained until he is gone. […] Any easing of sanctions will be considered only when there is a new government.”
  • State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher, May 8: “There will be no normal relationships with the United States or many other countries by Iraq as long as Saddam is in power. The President said the sanctions are going to stay there as far as we are concerned.”
  • President Bush, May 20: “My view is we don’t want to lift these sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in power.”
  • Secretary of State James Baker, May 22: “We can have a formal cease-fire but no genuine peace with the government of Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. […] We will never normalize relations with Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power.  That means maintaining UN sanctions in place so long as Saddam remains in power.”
  • President Bush, September 23: “It is the United States view that we must keep the United Nations sanctions in place as long as [Saddam Hussein] remains in power.”

In pursuing this policy of permanent hostility to Hussein’s regime, the US denied it any real incentive to fully comply with UN weapons inspections. Saddam Hussein’s intransigence thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Just before entering the office of the presidency, Bill Clinton made a statement suggesting that some form of reconciliation with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a possibility:

I am a Baptist. I believe in death-bed conversions. If he [Hussein] wants a different relationship with the United States and the United Nations, all he has to do is change his behavior.

The very next day he appeared to move away from this position at a news conference in a confusing and contradictory statement. He asserted on the one hand that “I will evaluate what I do based on his conduct” but in the very next sentence stated that “I have no intention of normalizing relations with him.”

Much of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy was marked by a facade of nuance and smart diplomacy, its policy towards Iraq was no different. At the United Nations, his administration continued blocking exemptions from the sanctions needed to repair Iraq’s devastated infrastructure and allow its people to be provided with the basic necessities of life. This was much to the annoyance of other members of the UN Security Council, such as France, China and Russia. In fact, because the sanctions imposed by the Security Council had no end date, they would go on until the council approved of yet another resolution explicitly lifting them. Since the US, as a permanent member of the Security Council, could utilize its veto power to block any resolution from going forward, lifting the sanctions was rendered impossible as long as the US objected to it. This became known as the “reverse veto.”

In March 1997, Madeleine Albright rather bluntly restated US policy: “we do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted.” She also engaged in further self-fulfilling prophecy by saying that “the evidence is overwhelming that Saddam Hussein’s intentions will never be peaceful.” Albright would later note half-heartedly that the regime change policy “appeared” to interfere with Iraq’s motivation to fully cooperate with the UN.

In November 1997, after Iraq briefly ejected UN weapons inspectors, Clinton said “what he has just done is to ensure that the sanctions will be there until the end of time or as long as he lasts.”

In late 1998, US Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act with bipartisan support and President Clinton signed it into law on October 31. The law further dedicated the US to the cause of regime change in Iraq and authorized funding for opposition groups opposed to Saddam Hussein’s rule. On December 19, Clinton declared that “so long as Saddam remains in power he will remain a threat to his people, his region and the world.”

In a February 2004 article for Mother Jones, Seth Ackerman elaborated how many of the false and misleading WMD claims offered by George W. Bush’s administration originated in the Clinton administration to justify the sanctions policy. Ackerman recalled a speech given by Clinton in 1998 that utilized the story of Hussein Kamel, son-in-law of Saddam Hussein and government defector who claimed to the UN and the CIA that Iraq was “cheating” the weapons inspectors, to justify his claim that “Iraq still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions.” It was not until early 2003 that some long suppressed–yet incredibly important–details in the transcript of Kamel’s interview with Western intelligence agencies and UN inspectors appeared in a short story by Newsweek‘s John Barry. In the transcript, Kamel stated that “all weapons–biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed” in the summer following the Gulf War. An August 1995 CIA report (declassified in redacted form in 1996) reiterated some of his claims, making it clear that the Clinton administration must have been aware of all his claims. While Kamel also stated that this destruction was for the purpose of duping UN inspectors so that Iraq could resume its WMD program later on, it is perfectly clear that the Clinton administration was incredibly deceptive by selectively revealing Kamel’s assertions to the US public. As Ackerman described it:

As of 1995, Iraq was left with practically nothing from its past programs. Virtually all its old dual-use equipment was now under U.N. monitoring, and, as Kamel told the U.N., the regime’s WMD stockpiles were destroyed. While Iraq could not be declared officially “disarmed” until the inspectors had accounted for every detail of its byzantine prewar weapons programs, in practice even the most hawkish inspectors admitted that once the monitoring system was up and running, Iraq lost its entire ability to rebuild the arsenal that it had destroyed in 1991.

Ultimately, US “containment” policy through sanctions ended up killing an estimated 1.7 million Iraqis. By accepting this “price” as worthy of being paid (in the terminology of Robert Gates and Madeleine Albright) in the name of thwarting Saddam, sanctions advocates casually legitimized the reasoning neoconservatives would later use to justify civilian deaths caused by the US invasion and occupation. By repeatedly demonizing Saddam Hussein as an irrational actor who only understood the logic of massive force, they paved the way for neoconservatives to assert that only a US invasion could end his purported threat to world peace.

In the months after the US invaded Iraq and the search for WMDs came up dry, it is perhaps warranted that pro-war conservatives began circulating quotes from prominent Democrats vilifying Iraq’s government and calling for various actions against it, even if none of them explicitly endorsed the massive US invasion that took place or the unilateral means by which the Bush administration waged it.

In conclusion, it is deceptive to portray many of the same figures who led the charge for regime change in Iraq as favorable contrasts to the neoconservatives. Robert “Iraqis will pay the price” Gates is today seen as a clear-eyed non-partisan, James “so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power” Baker a wise old realist and Madeleine “we think the price is worth it” Albright a smart multilateralist. Yet all three of these individuals were willing to commit the US to a stubborn policy of regime change that costed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and eventually enabled the the neocons to realize their dream of a unilateral invasion.

As the US moves into another presidential election season, questions will inevitably raised about Hillary Clinton’s vote as Senator to authorize George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq. I posit that such concerns, while valid and necessary, are only superficial without a much deeper look at the imperialist rot that rests deep within US political culture. It is not enough to object to the US directly invading Iraq without UN approval. We must be willing to ask why the US feels the need to impose its will on Third World countries, even when it does so without overtly violating international norms.

How the proposed NY “Terrorist Registry” would shred due process

According to Capital New York: “a proposed public registry of terrorists in New York could include tens of thousands of individuals who have never been convicted of a crime.” The text of the legislation can be found here and is mirrored here.

The bill’s proposal to publicly list those convicted of “terrorist offenses” is bad enough considering that the broad legal definition of terrorism can include freeing a mink and sending humanitarian aid to Palestinians. But even worse are the provisions of the bill requiring those who have ever engaged in any “verifiable act of terrorism” to be added to the registry. According to the bill, this includes:

  • Individuals who have been deported by the US government based on mere suspicion of involvement in or support for terrorist activities. The process by which people have been deported from the US based on suspicion of “material support” for terrorism has long been criticized for its lack of fairness and common sense. For example, people have been deported even when the “material support” they gave was coerced from them by a designated terrorist group.
  • Those who have ever been detained by any US government agency “on the grounds that such person was at any time a foreign enemy combatant or an illegal enemy combatant.” This would serve to further legitimate the unlawful designation of persons as “enemy combatants” without any due process whatsoever and add insult to injury to those such as Jose Padilla (a US citizen, it should be noted) who were detained and tortured by the US government without so much as a single charge against them.
  • Persons convicted of involvement in or support for terrorist activities by a Combat Status Review Tribunal or Military Commission. In other words, the convictions of blatantly unfair kangaroo courts used in places such as Guantanamo Bay will be used to add people to the registry.
  • Here’s easily the most egregious one: “listed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center on the terrorist screening database.” As the Capital New York article notes “there are more than a million people in this database.” There have also been questions raised by the ACLU and the Government Accountability Office about the complete lack of accurate or conclusive evidence or information implicating listed individuals in involvement with terrorism.
  • People identified by the US government as having taken part in terrorists activities against the US or are members of designated terrorist groups. One wonders whether or not the state of New York will fairly apply this standard to those who are members of far-right Jewish groups such as Kach and Kahane Chai.

The registry would impose requirements for forensic information from persons listed. This includes a photograph of the listed individual that would have to be updated annually and taken by a law enforcement agency, a complete set of fingerprints and a DNA sample. Other information needed includes:

A complete description of the terrorist’s employment duties, work locations, job titles and tools and materials utilized during the course of employment, and in the case of a terrorist who is a student, a complete description of the terrorist’s classes taken, classroom locations, and educational credits; and a complete list of the terrorist’s supervisors, and in the case of a terrorist who is a student, a complete list of the terrorist’s professors

According to Capital New York:

Croci’s bill passed the Senate’s Veterans, Homeland Security and Military Affairs committee last month. It passed unanimously without debate, and as is the case with an overwhelming majority of bills considered in committee in Albany, no outside experts were invited to publicly testify.

Let’s hope that it advances no further.

Quote of the day: “Destroying Iraq” was the goal

I recently was in Jordan, and I was confronted by many of the Iraqis who have fled from Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. […] I sat at dinner with a number of them, and the question that many of them asked me was, why is the United States in Iraq? And I sort of dismissed the ideas that have been advanced at various times in this Hall […] After I had exhausted my ideas about what it might be about, I asked the Iraqis to tell me what they thought this was about. And they said, well, it is pretty clear that what your goal was, and you succeeded almost at this point, in dividing Iraq into three pieces and destroying Iraq as ever being an Arab nation. That was your goal from the start; and you have, by every decision you have made, you have worked in that direction.

Rep. Jim McDermott, 22 September 2005

State Dept. spokesperson incites right-wing ragegasm by stating what neocons once said

Marie Harf, yesterday:

We’re killing a lot of them [ISIS militants] and we’re going to keep killing more of them. So are the Egyptians, so are the Jordanians. They’re in this fight with us. But we cannot win this war by killing them. We cannot kill our way out of this war. We need in the medium to longer term to go after the root causes that leads people to join these groups, whether it’s lack of opportunity for jobs […] We can work with countries around the world to help improve their governance. We can help them build their economies so they can have job opportunities for these people.

The right-wing blogosphere has, predictably, gone ballistic over this. But the fact of the matter is that many neocons once promoted the Iraq War by asserting similar arguments–namely, that a democratic and prosperous Iraq would neutralize the anti-American sentiment and Islamic extremism that plagues the Middle East. In fact, an argument similar to Harf’s was used by none other than Mitt Romney during the third presidential debate in 2012:

This is obviously an area of great concern to the entire world and to America in particular, which is to see a — a complete change in the — the — the structure and the — the environment in the Middle East. With the Arab Spring came a great deal of hope that there would be a change towards more moderation and opportunity for greater participation on the part of women and — and public life and in economic life in the Middle East.

But instead we’ve seen in nation after nation a number of disturbing events. Of course, we see in Syria 30,000 civilians having been killed by the military there. We see in — in — in Libya an attack apparently by — well, I think we know now by terrorists of some kind against — against our people there, four people dead. Our hearts and minds go to them. Mali has been taken over, the northern part of Mali, by al-Qaida-type individuals. We have in — in Egypt a Muslim Brotherhood president.

And so what we’re seeing is a — a — a pretty dramatic reversal in the kind of hopes we had for that region. Of course, the greatest threat of all is Iran, four years closer to a nuclear weapon. And — and we’re going to have to recognize that we have to do as the president has done. I congratulate him on — on taking out Osama bin Laden and going after the leadership in al-Qaida. But we can’t kill our way out of this mess.

We’re — we’re going to have to put in place a very comprehensive and robust strategy to help the — the world of Islam and — and other parts of the world reject this radical violent extremism which is — it’s really not on the run. It’s certainly not hiding. This is a group that is now involved in 10 or 12 countries, and it presents an enormous threat to our friends, to the world, to America long term, and we must have a comprehensive strategy to help reject this kind of extremism.

Later, Romney expanded on his strategy:

Well, my strategy’s pretty straightforward, which is to go after the bad guys, to make sure we do our very best to interrupt them, to — to kill them, to take them out of the picture. But my strategy is broader than — than that. That’s — that’s important, of course, but the key that we’re going to have to pursue is a — is a pathway to — to get the Muslim world to be able to reject extremism on its own. We don’t want another Iraq. We don’t want another Afghanistan. That’s not the right course for us. The right course for us is to make sure that we go after the — the people who are leaders of these various anti-American groups and these — these jihadists, but also help the Muslim world.

And how we do that? A group of Arab scholars came together, organized by the U.N., to look at how we can help the — the world reject these — these terrorists. And the answer they came up was this.

One, more economic development. We should key our foreign aid, our direct foreign investment and that of our friends — we should coordinate it to make sure that we — we push back and give them more economic development.

Number two, better education.

Number three, gender equality.

Number four, the rule of law. We have to help these nations create civil societies.

I suppose today’s wingnuts would just denounce Romney as a RINO anyhow, but many of those same wingnuts were making the same exact argument during the Bush years.

Just look at what current-day genocidal nutcase Pat Dollard once said in 2006 (mirrored here):

There were much more important reasons to topple Saddam–terrorism being one of them. The root causes of terrorism are the lack of capitalism, the lack of democracy, and the lack of modern education. What has stood in the way of those things has primarily been the regimes of Iraq, Iran, and Syria. We just got one of them out of the way. […] Getting at the root of terror is clear: topple these regimes and then bring democracy, capitalism, and education to the Islamic world. Let them have the hot wife, the Bimmer, and kids to live for. America has to lift them up, not because we are a country of great guys, but to keep them from growing into lost killer boys with the U.S. in their sights.

“Lost killer boys” sounds practically sympathetic to the plight of Islamic extremists. Sounds like the same bleeding heart stuff we hear from Harf, in fact.

Charles Krauthammer and the bravery of pro-war punditry

brendle

Charles Krauthammer, 29 Jan. 2015:

On the 70th anniversary of Auschwitz, mourning dead Jews is easy. And, forgive me, cheap. Want to truly honor the dead? Show solidarity with the living — Israel and its 6 million Jews. Make “never again” more than an empty phrase. It took Nazi Germany seven years to kill 6 million Jews. It would take a nuclear Iran one day.

Excuse me Charles, but how exactly is it a sign of bravery to endorse the bombing and continued economic strangulation of the Iranian people from your perch at the Washington Post? Could someone please explain to me why–if simply “mourning dead Jews is easy”–is it that warmongering and shilling on behalf of Zionist interests from American soil is somehow a difficult task?

I’m getting awfully tired of right-wing pundits asserting themselves to be heroic warriors for their verbal support of US and Israeli militarism. It is too often that we hear appeals to masculinity and “manliness” in supporting imperialist war crimes and aggression. Besides, where is the personal sacrifice and bravery in tweeting/blogging/writing/broadcasting “bomb Iran” from the comfort of the First World?

In addition to chiding Americans for the ease with which they mourn “dead Jews,” Krauthammer asserts that supporting Israeli expansionism and demonizing Iranians is a great way to show “solidarity” with the Jewish people. This is based on a false reading of Iranian and Palestinian intentions and a complete neglect of the factual circumstances of their historic grievances against Israel and the US. There is no justice in supporting Israel’s ongoing confiscation of the West Bank from the Palestinians as a means of expressing compensation for the Holocaust. There also is no just reason for punishing the Iranian nation, which has a history of non-aggression, for its pursuit of the same nuclear capabilities Israel now has.